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Abstract
Successful individuals were frequently found to be overly opti-
mistic. These …nding are puzzling, as one could expect that realists
would perform best in the long run. We show, however, that in a large
class of strategic interactions of either cooperation or competition, the
equilibrium payo¤s of optimists may be higher than those of realists.
This is because the very fact of being optimistic changes the game,
and drives the adversary to change her equilibrium behavior, possi-
bly to the bene…t of the optimist. Suppose, then, that a population
consists initially of individuals with various perceptional tendencies
– pessimists and optimists to various extents, as well as of realists.
Individuals meet in pairs to interact, and more successful tendencies
proliferate faster. We show that as time goes by, some moderate de-
gree of optimism will take over, and outnumber all other tendencies.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is by now a considerable body of evidence, that in many kinds of cir-
cumstances, successful individuals are overly optimistic regarding the return
to their own investment or e¤ort. Taylor and Brown (1988) found that most
mentally healthy people have somewhat unrealistically positive self-views,
while the less mentally healthy perceive themselves more accurately. In peer
reviews, for example, non-depressed individuals’ self-ratings were consider-
ably more favorable than those given to them by others (Lewinsohn, Mischel,
Chaplin and Barton 1980). Non-depressed individuals exhibited an illusion
of control in a dice-throwing experiment (Fleming and Darley 1986), and
most individuals believe that their driving ability is above average (Sven-
son 1981). In the Economic arena, excess entry of new businesses that fail
within several years is common in the US, and recent experimental work
(Camerer and Lovallo 1999) suggests that this phenomenon may be due to
entrepreneurs being overcon…dent regarding their own ability in comparison
with other entrepreneurs.
These observations naturally lead the following puzzle: Given that human
beings are technically capable of evaluating their stakes in a cold-blooded
fashion, how come that consistent biases in estimation survive evolutionary
pressures? If success pays o¤ in wealth, which translates to more supportable
descendants and more imitators, one might have guessed that individuals
whose estimations are not biased would perform best on average, and thus
would outnumber the biased types in the long run.
What we aim at o¤ering here is an insight based on the consequences of
optimism in strategic interactions. These consequences are twofold. On the
down side, optimistic individuals do not react optimally to their environment
as shaped by the objective setting and the actions of others. But on the up
side, the very fact of being optimistic changes the environment, as it drives
others to change their behavior. When biased individuals misperceive their
payo¤s in the interaction, the resulting equilibrium behavior and true payo¤s
are di¤erent than those that would appear if the interacting parties were
both realistic. Given a speci…c way the other party perceives her utility, it
may very well “pay” to misperceive one’s own utility, so that the resulting
equilibrium would be better according to the true payo¤s. For moderate
levels of optimism, this bene…cial e¤ect outweighs the losses due to the biases
in judgement, in a large class of interactions.
Cautious optimism may pay o¤ in games with strategic substitutes as
2well as in games with strategic complements. This is because overestimation
of the return to one’s e¤ort translates to a more aggressive reaction curve
- i.e. a higher level of investment for any given level of investment by the
adversary. When the two parties are competing with one another and the
reaction curves are downward-sloping, aggressiveness would “intimidate” the
adversary and induce her to invest less, possibly to the bene…t of the aggres-
sor. And when the two parties are cooperating, with upward-sloping reaction
curves, aggressiveness would encourage the other party to invest more, poten-
tially bene…ting the aggressor in this case as well. A “hard-wired” optimism
implies that the individual is committed to react more strongly, and this
commitment may thus yield strategic advantages.
The bene…ts of commitment to non-optimal reactions in strategic inter-
actions is well established in the literature – in remuneration schemes for the
managers of …rms in oligopoly (Fershtman and Judd 1987), or in domestic
subsidy schemes for exporters that compete (imperfectly) with foreign …rms
in international markets (Brander and Spencer 1985, Eaton and Grossman
1986). In a similar vein, the positive return to being fair (Güth and Yaari
1992, Huck and Oechssler 1998), socially minded (Fershtman and Weiss 1997,
1998), altruistic (Bester and Güth 1998), spiteful (Possajennikov 1999), con-
cerned with relative success (Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi 1998), or overcon…dent
in …nancial investments (Kyle and Wang 1997), may render a population with
such non-sel…sh or irrational individuals evolutionary stable, i.e. immune to
the appearance of few sel…sh or rational “mutants”.1
In the current work, we take these ideas one step further. We show under
what conditions optimism would evolve in a full-‡edged, dynamic evolution-
ary context. Our main result is as follows. Let there be any initial distri-
bution2 of types in the population – realistic, pessimistic to various degrees
or optimistic to various degrees. If individuals are frequently and repeatedly
matched in pairs at random, get the (true) payo¤s in the equilibrium of the
interaction (as they perceive it according to their types), and proliferate in a
speed which is monotonically increasing in their true payo¤s, then in the long
run the cautious optimists would reign the population. The exact degree of
1Related ideas appear already in the works of Frank (1987, 1988). The indirect evo-
lutionary approach, where the preferences rather than the strategies are the subject of
evolutionary pressures, is employed also by Dekel and Scotchmer (1999), Rogers (1994),
Robson (1996a,b), Waldman (1994) and Vega-Redondo (1997). See also further references
in the sequel.
2with an adequate support -see more below
3optimism that would wipe out all other types depends, of course, on the true
payo¤s of the game. But for a large family of two-player games, a positive,
moderate degree of optimism would emerge.3
To prove our result, we consider an arti…cial, preliminary game, in which
two players can commit simultaneously to their degree of optimism, knowing
that consequently they will be playing the equilibrium of the game de…ned
by the types to which they committed, but get the true payo¤s that result
from their behavior. If the reaction curves in this preliminary game (where,
again, the choice variables are optimism levels) has a slope with absolute
value between 0 and 1, then the preliminary game will have a unique Nash
equilibrium, to which a cob-web process of myopic best responses would
converge. Under some mild assumptions, this cob-web process can also be
interpreted as a process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies, and strategies that are thus eliminated are wiped o¤ by the replicator
dynamics or any other regular, payo¤ monotonic dynamics. This last result is
known for a distribution of strategies or types with a …nite support (Samuel-
son and Zhang 1992), and is proved in the appendix for general distributions
when the payo¤ function is continuous.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brings a simple example
that exhibits most of the properties of the model. Section 3 discusses several
interpretational issues. Section 4 continues with a family of quadratic payo¤
functions, where the resulting optimism level has a closed form. Section 5
explores general conditions on the payo¤ functions which are su¢cient for our
results to hold. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 A Simple Example
Consider a bilateral Cournot game, with no production costs, and where the
p r i c ei ss o m ep o s i t i v ec o n s t a n t® minus total quantity. Pro…ts as a function
of produced quantities q1;q 2 are therefore
¦1(q1;q2)=( ® ¡ q1 ¡ q2)q1 (2.1)
¦2(q1;q2)=( ® ¡ q1 ¡ q2)q2
3In a similar dynamic setting, Huck, Kirchsteiger and Oechssler (1997) examine the
emergence of an endowment e¤ect – an excess valuation of one’s own endowment in bar-
gaining. They show that the proportion of realists with no such e¤ect will shrink to zero
with time, as will types with a very high endowment e¤ect. However, unlike in our case,
the dynamics is not shown to converge in the long run.
4Think of this game more abstractly, though: interpret q1;q 2 as levels of
e¤ort or investment, with increasing marginal costs to e¤ort. The interacting
parties are competing with each other – the higher the e¤ort exerted by the
other party, the lower is the return to every unit of one’s own e¤ort.
Individuals often meet and interact in this fashion with each other. How-
ever, not all individuals conceive the interaction in the same way: Pessimist
types underestimate the parameter ®; optimists overestimate it, and only
realists assess it correctly. If players 1 and 2 in the interaction believe ® to
be ®1 and ®2; respectively, they conceive their utility functions to be
U1(q1;q2)=( ®1 ¡ q1 ¡ q2)q1 (2.2)
U2(q1;q2)=( ®2 ¡ q1 ¡ q2)q2
Let us assume that the players play the unique Nash equilibrium of the game












This is either because the assessments ®1; ®2 a r e“ w r i t t e no nt h ep l a y e r s ’
foreheads” and are thus mutually recognized immediately, or alternatively
because the players approach pretty quickly this equilibrium behavior after
several rounds in which they each play their best response to the other’s
previous action (or some average of the other’s previous actions).


















Imagine now that these payo¤s translate into …tness terms, and re‡ect
fertility rates: the number of descendants of each individual is monotonically
increasing in the payo¤s of her interactions during her lifetime, and the de-
scendants inherit the individual’s assessment of ®: The way this assessment
4given that ®1 and ®2 are not too far below or above ®, so that the Nash equilibrium
is interior. In section 4 we show that the analysis below is valid also when corner Nash
equilibria are possible.
5is inherited can be interpreted as either purely biological, or as a process in
which parents transmit their “optimism level” to their children via educa-
tion, or as a process where more successful “approaches to life” are imitated
more often and become more popular in the next generation.
Suppose that the population of individuals is large. At each moment of
time, individuals are matched in pairs to interact. This matching occurs at
random, according to the current distribution of optimism levels in the pop-
ulation. Reproduction takes place instantaneously, where reproduction rates
of individuals are increasing in their success in the interactions, as explained
above. In short, the distribution of optimism levels in the population evolves
according to a regular, payo¤ monotonic dynamics.
Where would this process lead the population? What optimism levels
would perform best and survive in the long run? To analyze this problem,
consider …rst a two-player game with payo¤s as speci…ed in (2.4) above.
This is a preliminary, arti…cial game, in which the players have to commit
simultaneously to their assessments ®1; ®2 of the parameter ®, knowing that
consequently they will be bound to play the Nash equilibrium strategies (2.3)
of the perceived game (2.2), but where the true payo¤s are indicated in the
original game (2.1).
In this preliminary game of commitment, where the choice variables are

















In other words, at equilibrium the players will commit to overestimate ® by
20%, and therefore to behave as if the return to each unit of their e¤ort is
larger by 1
5® than it actually is5.
5In the preliminary game, the players e¤ectively commit to their reaction functions in
the e¤ort game. At equilibrium, they would not choose their reaction function di¤erently
had they been Stackelberg leaders in the e¤ort game – each chooses her reaction function so
as to intersect that of her opponent in the most prefered point for her along the opponent’s
reaction function.
6Notice further that the slope of the reaction functions (2.5) is ¡1
4, smaller
than 1 in absolute value. Consequently, the cob-web process of myopic best
responses converges to the Nash equilibrium (2.6). If we start this process
with both players choosing ®1 = ®2 =0 ; the process can be immediately
read as iterative elimination of dominated strategies: If player 1 commits to
a non-negative assessed ®; it is better for player 2 to commit to 3
2® than
to commit any higher assessment. Understanding this, committing to 9
8® is
better for player 1 than committing to any lower assessment. But with this
in mind, player 2 is better o¤ committing to 39
32® than to any higher value,
and so forth.
It turns out that when we come back to our original population dynam-
ics, assessments that do not survive the iterative elimination of dominated
strategies are wiped o¤ by regular, payo¤ monotonic dynamics6.T h a ti s ,a s
time goes by, the cautious optimists who overestimate ® by 20% will gradually
take over the population. Whatever is the initial distribution of assessments
in the population, it will converge in distribution to the point mass7 6
5® –




Before we continue with more general results, we sidestep to discuss several
interpretational issues of the model.
3.1 Learning about ® with time
The above example raises immediately the following question: How come
that optimists do not come to realize that they overestimate ® once they
observe their true payo¤s (2.4)? Two possible interpretations are in order
here.
Suppose, …rstly, that the nature of interaction changes over time: the
value of ® ‡uctuates at random, so that past realizations of ® provide little
or no information regarding its current value. Individuals are technically
6Samuelson and Zang (1992) proved this result for distributions with a …nite support.
We prove it for general distributions and continuous payo¤ functions in the appendix.
7In other words, for any ">0; the proportion of types in the population who overes-
timate ® by 20% ¡ " to 20% + " will eventually become larger than 1 ¡ ":
7able to recognize this current value at once. However, our result implies that
those who systematically tend to moderately overestimate the true value,
whatever is its realization, are those who prosper and proliferate.
A second potential interpretation is that individuals do face uncertainty
regarding the true current value of ®: To illustrate, suppose there are two
possible values of ® –ah i g hv a l u e®h and a low value ®`: The realizations are
independent across periods, where the high value ®h appears with probability
p: Let pt be the realized frequency ®h by period t: By the strong law of large
numbers, pt converges to p almost surely.
Suppose that individuals start with an initial, prior distribution in mind
regarding the probability of ®h; a distribution that contains the true p in
its support. Individuals form their posteriors using Bayes rule. Realistic
individuals use the observed pt in this updating process, and therefore their
posteriors will converge in distribution to a point mass on p almost surely.
Since the utility functions (2.1) are quadratic, these individuals act in period
t +1as they would in case there was no uncertainty, and the value of ® is
the average ®t of their posterior in that period. Thus, ®t will converge to
p®h +( 1¡ p)®` almost surely.
In contrast, optimistic types do not use pt when they update their be-
l i e f s :I ns o m eo ft h ep e r i o d sw h e r e®` appears and thus the return to their
e¤ort is low, they discard the observation, attributing it to exceptional, non-
systematic bad circumstances, which render the outcome irrelevant for updat-
ing. As they keep discarding the same proportion of the ®` realizations along
the periods, their posterior will converge almost surely to a point mass on
some p0 >p :Therefore, they will almost surely tend to act as if they believed
that the parameter in their utility function (2.1) is ®0 = p0®h +( 1¡ p0)®`,
which is higher than the true average ® = p®h +( 1¡ p)®`: The higher the
optimism level, the higher the proportion of discarded ®` realizations, and
hence the higher ®0 becomes.
Similarly, pessimistic types consistently discard some proportion of the
®h realizations, assuming that the high return to their e¤ort in those periods
was due to exceptionally favorable circumstances, which should exclude those
observations from the sample. Consequently, they will almost surely tend to
behave as if they believed that the parameter in their utility function (2.1)
is lower than the true average ® = p®h +( 1¡ p)®`:
83.2 Optimism regarding what?
In our model, pessimists believe that the return to their e¤ort is low, and
indeed at equilibrium they end up investing relatively little e¤ort in interac-
tions. Couldn’t the pessimists be regarded, though, as believing that their
utility from leisure is high, and therefore as optimistic about their “return
from leisure”? More broadly, isn’t it the case that the limited resources of an
individual are always distributed between several lanes, and hence relative
optimism regarding the return in some of them immediately implies relative
pessimism regarding the return in the others?
This view is certainly a legitimate one. Still, there is clearly room for
a distinction between leisure wilfully invested in recreation or resting, and
time waisted in idleness by default rather than by choice. It is not that
uncommon for individuals to spend part of their time “not doing anything”,
without consciously preferring whatever they are in fact doing over potential
alternatives. It is then meaningless to discuss what they perceive to be their
return from idleness: If the individual is unaware of her revealed preference
for idleness, it is absurd to assume that this preference is further distorted
unconsciously in her mind.
In our model, individuals choose the amount of e¤ort to be invested in
interactions, implicitly implying that unused individual resources are left
idle. With the above interpretation of idleness, it is indeed sensible to use
unambiguously the term “optimism” to mean overestimation of the return to
one’s e¤ort: Such an overestimation does not imply an (absolute or relative)
underestimation or pessimism regarding the return to idleness – a phrase
which is simply a contradiction in terms.
3.3 Larger families of perceived utility functions
We have thus far considered a one-dimensional family of distortions in the
perception of one’s utility function - those that result from di¤erent evalua-
tions of the parameter ®: W h a tw o u l dh a p p e ni fw ew e r et oc o n s i d e revery
possible distortion of the utility function?
Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (1998) show that if the distribution of types (i.e.
perceived utilities) ever reaches a stable state in which all the individuals take
the same action, then this action must be e¢cient. In our Cournot example,
this action is the cartel quantity ®
4: A population of types who all take another
action q 6= ®
4 is not immune to an invasion of mutants who perceive their
9utility di¤erently. To see why, assume for simplicity that all the individuals
are of the same type t: Consider a mutant t0 that di¤ers from t only by
the fact that it perceives its utility from forming a cartel to be extremely
high (much more than the true payo¤). Thus, when a mutant t0 meets an
incumbent t; she will play q, just as an incumbent t would, so that both t
and t0 get the same true payo¤ when matched with t.B u t w h e n a m u t a n t
t0 meets another mutant t0 they form a cartel, and fare better. Hence, such
mutants would not tend to disappear.
This result is static in nature. In particular, it does not predict if and
when a payo¤ monotonic dynamics would ever converge. Moreover, it does
not preclude stable states with a polymorphic distribution of types. But
in any case, it does imply that our result need not hold with an extended
family of utility distortions, and it leads to ask what biases are relevant for
consideration and in which contexts.
For example, it might be relevant to consider a type that, for some pe-
culiar reason, likes extremely to take part in a cartel (®
4; ®
4) for one speci…c
value ®: However, it looks much less natural to consider a type that extremely
likes to form a cartel (®
4; ®
4) for di¤erent values of ®; i.e. if and when the en-
vironment changes. This is because the cartel strategies are the result of a
logical, non-trivial calculation, that necessarily goes through a computation
using the true payo¤ function. Therefore, it is rather arti…cial to consider
somebody who is conscious of her true payo¤s function, and is yet committed
to distort it in her mind.
In contrast, our optimistic types who unconsciously but systematically
overestimate the objective parameter ® (or its average) do not go through
the correct computation and then ignore it. Rather, they tend to misperceive
the environment before any computation is carried out. In this respect, the
family of types that we consider seems to be a natural abstraction of relevant
and frequently observed human biases.
It will certainly be of interest to model more families of biases, and con-
front the theoretical predictions with empirical …ndings. The results of Dekel
et al. (1997) show that the triumph of biased types is not a trivial result in
such an exercise, and thus open the door for a challenging process of modeling
relevant biases.
104 A family of games with quadratic payo¤s
In this section we provide a full analysis of our argument for a class of two-
player games with quadratic payo¤s. The next section will explore how the
argument can be extended to an even larger class of games.
T h ep a y o ¤f u n c t i o n sw ec o n s i d e rh e r et a k et h ef o r m
¦i(qi;q j)=( ® ¡ bqj ¡ cqi)qi for i =1 ;2 and j =2¡ i (4.1)
where the parameters satisfy ®>0; ¡1 · b · 1 and c ¸ 1: As in section
2a b o v e ,t h ea c t i o n sq1;q 2 ¸ 0 are to be interpreted as the amount of e¤ort
the players invest in the interaction. When b is positive, the game exhibits
strategic substitutes – the higher the investment of player j; the lower the
return to each unit of e¤ort of player i: With a negative b; t h eg a m eh a s
strategic complements – there is a positive, linear correlation of the return
to one’s e¤ort with the e¤ort level of the other player. The marginal cost of
e¤ort is increasing with rate 2c: In section 2 we had b =1 ;c=1 :
Types of individuals are distinguished by the way they perceive the pa-
rameter ®: Thus, type ®i of player i perceives his utility function to be
Ui(qi;q j)=( ®i ¡ bqj ¡ cqi)qi (4.2)
A type is optimistic (realistic, pessimistic) regarding the return to his input
of e¤ort when ®i is bigger (equal, smaller) than ®: Types ®i belong to an








As explained in section 2, we assume that individuals recognize immediately8
each other’s types ®i;® j, and play the Nash equilibrium actions that result
8or alternatively after a short learning phase which we do not model here. Our results
on the emergence of moderate optimism would not be valid if individuals were unable to
identify the types with which they interact: If all the individuals plan against the same,
true distribution of types in the population, realistic types fare best by de…nition. Hence,
as Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (1998) and Ok and Vega-Redondo (1999) show (see also an
example in Possajennikov 1999), in any stable distribution of such a population dynamics,
all the individuals play a (true) Nash equilibrium strategy.
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The last case of (4.4) corresponds to the usual circumstance of an interior
Nash equilibrium, where both players invest positive amounts of e¤ort. When
b is positive (strategic substitutes), however, corner equilibria may appear,
where one of the players exerts zero e¤ort. These are re‡ected in the …rst
two cases of (4.4).
When an ®i type meets an ®j type, what is the true payo¤ of i? Substi-



















Assume now that there is a large population of individuals. The distri-
bution of types in the population is expressed by a probability measure Q on
the set [®;®] of possible types, endowed with the Borel ¾-…eld. We denote
fi(®i;Q) ´ EQfi(®i;¢) (4.6)
the average true payo¤ of an individual of type ®i w h e nm a t c h e dw i t ha n
individual j drawn at random from the population. When both i and j are
drawn at random from the population, the average true payo¤ to i is
fi(Q;Q) ´ EQfi(¢;Q) (4.7)
As a …rst step, we assume now that the instantaneous rate with which
the probability distribution Q evolves is determined by the di¤erence between
(4.6) and (4.7):
¾i(®i;Q)=fi(®i;Q) ¡ fi(Q;Q) (4.8)
That is, if Q(t) is the probability distribution at time t; then for every (Borel)









12This di¤erential equation de…nes the replicator dynamics, which was in-
troduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) for distributions with a …nite support,
and by Oechssler and Riedel (1998) for general distributions. Qualitatively,
if the average performance of a set of types A is better than the average
population performance fi(Q;Q); the probability of A will increase, at the
expense of other sets of types whose average performance is worse than the
overall average. The speci…c quantitative form (4.9) is implied if we assume
that the absolute growth rate of an ®i-type individual is its true average
payo¤ (4.6), possibly plus some constant9.
More generally, we are also interested in other population dynamics in
which higher payo¤ implies higher growth-rate. Such more general dynamics
may be appropriate when the reproduction process of types is not purely
biological, but rather relies on education or imitation (see e.g. Weibull 1995,
section 4.4). Technically, the payo¤ di¤erential ¾i(®i;Q) in (4.9) should then
be replaced by another growth-rate function g :[ ®;®]£¢([®;®]) ! R which
9Indeed, let N(t) be a positive, …nite Borel measure on the set of types [®;®]; where
N(t)(A) expresses the “number” of individuals with types in the set A: Suppose that the













































which is indeed (4.9).
13always preserves the population size –
Z ®
®
g(¢;Q)dQ =0 ; (4.10)
is payo¤ monotonic –
g(®i;Q) >g (®
0
i;Q) () fi(®i;Q) >f i(®
0
i;Q) (4.11)
for every Q 2 ¢([®;®]); and is regular – bounded and K-Lipschitz continu-
ous for some …nite constant K
sup
®2[®;®];Q2¢([®;®])
jg(®;Q)j < 1 (4.12)
sup
®2[®;®]
jg(®;Q1) ¡ g(®;Q2)j <KkQ1 ¡ Q2k;Q 1;Q 2 2 ¢([®;®])







¯ is the variational norm on signed measures.
Oechssler and Riedel (1998, lemma 1) proved that the regularity of g guar-
antees that the mapping Q !
R ®
® g(¢;Q)dQ is bounded and Lipschitz contin-
uous in the variational norm, which implies that the di¤erential equation in





g(¢;Q(t))dQ(t);A µ [®;®] (4.13)
has a unique solution for any initial distribution Q(0):
We are now interested in the following question. Suppose that in the
dawn of time, the distribution of types in the population was Q(0): Suppose
further that both pessimistic types and optimistic types are well represented
in this initial population, by assuming that the support [®;®] of Q(0) contains
®: As time goes by, how will the distribution of types evolve with a regular,
payo¤ monotonic dynamics?
To answer this question, we consider, as in section 2, the arti…cial two-
player game where the players have to choose and commit to their types
simultaneously, and their payo¤s are as derived in (4.5) from the induced










14whenever maximizing (4.5) given ®j implies that both players exert positive
levels of e¤ort at that Nash equilibrium, so that the last case of (4.5) is
applicable. When b is positive, the best reply of player i is not unique for
big enough and for small enough values of ®j; and for these values (4.14) is
one of the best replies.





b3 ¡ 4cb2 +8 c3® (4.15)
which is strictly greater than ® for b 6=0 (when b =0 ; one can see from (4.1)
that individuals face a decision problem, not a genuine game with strategic
interaction).
Suppose then that the optimistic type (4.15) is in the support [®,®] of the
initial population Q(0) (and therefore also in the support of all the distribu-
tions Q(t), as our dynamics preserve the support of the initial distribution).
A s s u m en o wt h a ta ts o m ep o i n tt in time, the proportion of types smaller
than ®0 in the population becomes very small, for some ®0 <® ¤.I f b is
positive (negative), then by (4.5) for every e ®i greater (smaller) than ®¤
i(®0) it
i st h ec a s et h a t fi(®¤
i(®0);® j) ¸ fi(e ®i;® j) for ®j >® 0; and fi(®¤
i(®0);® ¤) is




0);Q(t)) >f i(e ®i;Q(t)) (4.16)
and therefore in a payo¤ monotonic dynamics, ®¤
i(®0) will reproduce more
quickly than any larger (smaller) type e ®i: By a similar argument, if the
proportion of types larger than ®00 in the population becomes very small,
then ®¤
i(®00) will reproduce more quickly than any smaller (larger) type.
Starting with ®0 = ®; it then follows that the proportion of types bigger
(smaller) than ®¤
i(®) will eventually become very small, as they will replicate
more slowly than ®¤
i(®): Repeating the argument implies that the proportion
of types smaller than ®¤
i (®¤
i(®)) will eventually become very small, because
they will replicate more slowly than ®¤
i (®¤
i(®)): Since the slope of (4.14) is














10When b is positive, there are also Nash equilibria where i commits to a high ®i and j
commits to ®j =0 : These equilibria are irrelevent for our analysis, which is only auxiliary
to that of the population dynamics.
15converges to ®¤: T h es a m ea p p l i e si fw es t a r tt h ep r o c e s sw i t h®00 = ®: Hence
®¤ will eventually replicate much faster than all other types, and “take over”
the population. This is the intuition for our main theorem below, which we
prove formally in the appendix.
Theorem 1 Let there be a large population of individuals with an initial dis-
tribution Q(0) of types ®i, characterized by their perceived utilities (4.2). In-
dividuals in this population are continuously matched in pairs, play the Nash
equilibrium (4.2) and thus get the payo¤ according to (4.5). Let (®¤;® ¤) be
the unique Nash equilibrium (4.15) of the symmetric two-player game where
each player chooses a type and gets the payo¤ (4.5). Then any regular, payo¤
monotonic dynamics on the types in this population will converge in distri-
bution to a unit mass on ®¤, provided only that the support of the initial
distribution Q(0) is an interval [®;®] that contains ®¤:
Thus, in the limit population, individuals are optimistic (®¤ >® ),a n da t
the Nash equilibrium (4.4) they exert more e¤ort then realistic players would
exert at the Nash equilibrium of (4.1). In the case of strategic substitutes (b>
0), these optimists are worse o¤ than realists, since the optimists compete
more …ercely. In the case of strategic complements (b<0), the optimists
fare better than the realists, because here the bigger investment of optimists
leads to enhanced cooperation.
5M o r e G e n e r a l I n t e r a c t i o n s
In the previous section, the relation between the true payo¤ function ¦i(qi;q j)
and the utility Ui(qi;q j) as perceived by some type had the structure
Ui(qi;q j)=¦ i(qi;q j)+¿iqi (5.1)
where the type was characterized by the parameter ¿i. Optimistic types had
positive ¿i; and thus overestimated the return to each unit of their e¤ort,
while the converse was the case for pessimistic types. In this formulation,
the types ranged in an interval [¿;¿]; where ¿ < 0 and ¿>0: We will now
try to explore how general can the true payo¤ function be taken to be, in
16order for our results to be sustained when types are characterized by their
parameter ¿i in (5.1).
Observe that our argument in the previous section hinged on the following
ingredients:
1. The slope of the reaction function of each type ¿i is between 0 and
1 in absolute value. Consequently, for every pair of types (¿i;¿j)
with utilities as in (5.1), the game has a unique Nash equilibrium
(qi(¿i;¿j);q j(¿i;¿j)): We denote
fi(¿i;¿j)=¦ i (qi(¿i;¿j);q j(¿i;¿j)) (5.2)
t h et r u ep a y o ¤o fi at this equilibrium.
2. When the reaction function of each type ¿i are downward sloping
(strategic substitutes), the level curves of ¦i are concave, and ¦i(qi;¢) is
decreasing. Similarly, when the reaction function of each type ¿i are up-
ward sloping (strategic complements), the level curves of ¦i are convex,
and ¦i(qi;¢) is increasing. As a result, in either case the level curves of
fi(¢;¿j) are single peaked. (To see this, suppose that ¿i(¿j) maximizes
fi(¢;¿j): Augmenting ¿i beyond ¿i(¿j) yields a more aggressive reaction
function of i; and thus the Nash equilibrium (qi(¢;¿j);q j(¢;¿j)) moves
rightward along the reaction function of j; and ¦i is weakly lowered. In
like fashion, diminishing ¿i from ¿i(¿j) yields a less aggressive reaction
function of i; so the Nash equilibrium (qi(¢;¿j);q j(¢;¿j)) moves leftward
along the reaction function of j; and ¦i gets weakly lower.) Therefore,
in the preliminary, arti…cial game of commitment to types with payo¤s
(5.2), the cob-web processes of myopic best replies
¿j(¿);¿ i (¿j(¿));¿ j (¿i (¿j(¿)));:::
and
¿j(¿);¿ i (¿j(¿));¿ j (¿i (¿j(¿)));:::
can be read as iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies.
3. In the preliminary game of commitment to types, the reaction functions
¿i(¿j) have a slope with absolute value between 0 and 1. (As a result,
that game had a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the limit of the
cob-web process of myopic best replies.)
17It turns out that these three properties hold if some expressions that in-
volve the …rst, second and third derivatives of ¦i obey certain strict inequal-
ities. This yields the following theorem, which we prove in the appendix.
Theorem 2 In C3(R2
+) t h e r ei sa no p e ns e t 11 of payo¤ functions ¦i(¢;¢) for
which the following holds true: Let there be an initial population of individuals
with di¤erent types ¿i; characterized by perceived utilities (5.1). The support
of the initial distribution is an interval [¿;¿]: Individuals in this population
are continuously matched in pairs, play the Nash equilibrium of (5.1) and thus
get the payo¤ according to (5.2). Let (¿¤;¿¤) be the unique Nash equilibrium
of the symmetric two-player game where each player chooses a type and gets
the payo¤ (5.2). Then the replicator dynamics on the types in this population
will converge in distribution to a unit mass on ¿¤, provided only that ¿¤ is in
the support of the initial distribution of types.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown how the pressures of explicit, dynamic evolutionary processes
select for moderate optimism rather than for realism, when …tness is gained
through interactions of either competition or cooperation in a large class of
games. According to this insight, the phenomenon of overcon…dence and
unrealistic self-esteem of individuals who face objective circumstances (or a
competitive market) may just be due to a bias that “pays” well in many
kinds of strategic settings.
Clearly, the way humans evaluate their capabilities has evolved along
the generations via con‡icts with both natural hazards and strategic adver-
saries or parties. The premises of our model are therefore far from being
all-encompassing. And on the implications side, our heterogenous society is
far from exhibiting the single approach or type, as in the long run prediction
of the model. Thus, our modest aim was to point at one possible source
for the apparently unreasonable optimism which is so frequently observed in
11C3(R2
+) is the space of thrice continuously di¤erentiable functions ¦:R2
+ ! R; with
the minimal topology in which ¦n converges to ¦ i¤ ¦n ¡ ¦ a n de a c ho fi t s… r s t ,s e c o n d
and third derivatives converge to zero uniformly on compact sets on R2
+.
18the process of decision making. Searching for competing and complementing
evolutionary insights for this and similar behavioral puzzles may prove to be
both challenging and rewarding.
7 Appendix
Theorem 1 is a corollary to the following theorem, which may be of separate
interest also on its own. It was proved by Samuelson and Zhang (1992) for
the particular case of games with …nitely many strategies. For notational
simplicity, we state it for symmetric two-player games with a compact one-
dimensional strategy space, but the method of proof works just as well for
more general compact strategy spaces and for asymmetric games.
Theorem 3 Let [®;®] µ R be a space of strategies, f :[ ®;®]£[®;®] ! R a
continuous payo¤ function of a symmetric two-player game, and g :[ ®;®] £
¢([®;®]) ! R a regular, payo¤ monotonic growth-rate function, satisfying
(4.10)-(4.12). Let Q(t) be the population dynamics de…ned by the di¤erential
equation (4.13) with an initial distribution of strategies Q(0): Suppose that
D µ [®;®] is the subset of strategies which do not survive the process of iter-
ated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Then the strategies in D are
asymptotically eliminated from the population: Every iteratively dominated
startegy d 2 D has an open neighborhood Wd for which lim
t!1Q(t)(Wd)=0 :
In particular, if there is only one non-eliminated strategy u 2 [®;®]nD; then
Q(t) converges in distribution to the unit mass ±u.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let Dn be the set of strategies that do not survive n or
less rounds of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, so D = [1
n=0Dn:
Denote also by Un =[ ®;®]nDn the set of strategies that do survive n rounds
of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We prove by induction on
n that Un is compact, and every eliminated strategy d 2 Dn has an open
neighborhood Wd for which lim
t!1Q(t)(Wd)=0 :
Since D0 = ; and U0 =[ ®;®]; the claim holds for n =0 : Suppose the
claim holds for n<k :Let d 2 Dk be round-k dominated by the strategy
19x 2 [®;®]; that is for every y 2 Uk¡1
f(x;y) ¡ f(d;y) > 0:
By the induction hypothesis Uk¡1 is compact, and since f is continuous,
the function [f(x;y) ¡ f(d;y)] attains its minimum on Uk¡1 :
min
y2Uk¡1
[f(x;y) ¡ f(d;y)] = ½>0:
Notice further that min
y2Uk¡1
[f(x;y) ¡ f(d;y)] is a continuous function of x
and d:12 It therefore follows that






d 2 Uk¡1 :m i n
y2Uk¡1





is an open set, so Uk =[ ®;®] n Dk is compact, as required.
The continuity of min
y2Uk¡1
[f(x;y) ¡ f(d;y)] also implies that there are













[f(xm;y) ¡ f(dm;y)]: Let y¤ be any accumulation point of the sequence y¤
m;
and y¤
r some sub-sequence of y¤
m which converges to y¤. So for any y0 2 Uk¡1;
f(xr;y¤
r) ¡ f(dr;y ¤
r) · f(xr;y0) ¡ f(dr;y0):
Taking the limits of both sides as r !1gives
f(x;y¤) ¡ f(d;y¤) · f(x;y0) ¡ f(d;y0):
Thus y¤ 2 arg min
y2Uk¡1
[f(x;y) ¡ f(d;y)]; and
min
y2Uk¡1
[f(xr;y) ¡ f(dr;y)] !r!1 min
y2Uk¡1
[f(x;y) ¡ f(d;y)]:
Decomposing the sequence fy¤
mg to subsequences fy¤
rg in such a way that each subsequence
converges to an accumulation point y¤; gives
min
y2Uk¡1




20Now, since f is continuous, the set
B = fy 2 [®;®]:f(x;y) ¡ f(d;y) · 0g
is a compact subset of the open set Dk¡1: Hence B is a proper subset of












is a compact subset of Dk¡1.F o rk =1the set C is empty, and Q(t)(C)=
0: For k>1; every y 2 C h a sa no p e nn e i g h b o r h o o dWy 3 y such that
lim
t!1
Q(t)(Wy)=0 ; by the induction hypothesis. Since C µ
S
y2C Wy and





















Since f is continuous on the compact domain [®;®] and hence also bounded,









and furthermore Q(t)(C) <" :In addition, we have inf
y2[®;®]nC
































21By the payo¤ monotonicity of the growth-rate function g; there exists a


























exp[±(t ¡ T)] !t!1 1:
Therefore, lim
t!1
Q(t)(Wd)=0 ; as required. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . As explained above the statement of the theorem,
we have to specify su¢cient conditions on the payo¤ function13 ¦i under
which the properties 1., 2. and 3. stated there hold.
1. Denote by bi(qj) the best reply function of an individual of type ¿i;






















Requiring this slope to be in the interval (-1,0) (strategic substitutes)
or in the interval (0,1) (strategic complements) for every qj de…nes in
each case an open subset in the function space C3(R2
+):
13we now resort to using superscripts for the players’ indices, while subscripts will denote
partial derivatives.




i)) = const. (A.3)










For such level curves to be concave (convex), the following expression














































w h i c hd e … n e si ne i t h e rc a s ea no p e ns u b s e ti nC3(R2
+): The further
requirement that ¦i(qi;¢) is decreasing (increasing), i.e. ¦i
j negative
(positive) for every qi, de…nes in either case another open subset of
C3(R2
+):
3. In order to express the slope of the reaction function ¿i(¿j); we make
the following observations. If ¿i(¿j) maximizes fi(¢;¿j); then the Nash
equilibrium (qi(¿i(¿j);¿j);qj(¿i(¿j);¿j)) is the point on the best reply
function bj(qi) of type ¿j which is on the highest (value-wise) of the
level curves I(qi) of ¦i that intersect bj(qi): At an interior solution, this
value-maximizing level curve of ¦i would thus be tangent to the best



























23This equality should hold for each type ¿j for which (qi(¿i(¿j);¿j);qj(¿i(¿j);¿j))




































































It now remains to express the partial derivatives of the Nash equilibrium
strategies qi(¿i;¿j) and qj(¿i;¿j) in terms of the partial derivatives of
¦i and ¦j of various orders. To this end, observe that at a Nash
equilibrium, qi(¿i;¿j) maximizes Ui(¢;qj(¿i;¿j)) for type ¿i: When the

































































j: Solving for these variables, substituting in



















































More explicitly, when the left-hand side is evaluated at ¿j; the right-
hand side is evaluated at (qi(¿i(¿j);¿j);qj(¿i(¿j);¿j)): Requiring this
expression to be in (-1,0) in the case of strategic substitutes (when (A.2)
is negative), or in (0,1) in the case of strategic complements (when (A.2)
is positive), de…nes in either case an open set in C3(R2
+):
24Taking the intersection of the …nitely many open subsets of C3(R2
+) men-
tioned in 1., 2. and 3. above, separately for the cases of strategic substitutes
and strategic complements, and then the union of these two intersections,
yields an open set of payo¤ functions ¦i in C3(R2
+) that satisfy the su¢cient
conditions that make our argument work. This open set contains, in partic-
ular, the quadratic payo¤ functions considered in section 4 (for which all the
third-order derivatives vanish), as well as many other payo¤ functions. ¥
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